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SECRETS DON’T MAKE FRIENDS, BUT THEY DO MAKE GOOD 
BUSINESS: PERCEPTION VERSUS REALITY IN PHYSICIAN 
FINANCIAL INCENTIVE PLANS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Who can we trust?  Even though physicians and patients appear 
disgruntled over managed care reimbursement, courts recognize that cost-
conserving measures are desirable and physician financial incentives may 
operate as the least restrictive and most effective control.  A balance must be 
struck between the policy to control inflationary health-care costs and 
physicians’ professional and ethical obligations.1  Forced to decide between 
two competing policy concerns, United States Courts of Appeals seem willing 
to accept the risk of lower quality health care in exchange for some constraint 
on exploding health-care costs. 
In bygone years, a patient could trust a physician to act solely in the 
patient’s best interest.  However, the complex world of third-party health-care 
reimbursement has muddled the picture.  Jeff, a fifty-five-year-old employee, 
has worked for Company since he graduated from college thirty-three years 
ago.2  In 1971, Jeff chose a local physician who submitted bills directly to his 
insurance company following treatment.  In the 1980s, Jeff saw his deductible 
and co-pay increase as insurance companies tried to generate enough revenue 
to offset expenditures.  In the early 1990s, Company added a managed care 
option to its health plan, whereby employees could reduce their out-of-pocket 
expenditures simply by selecting a health-care provider from an approved list. 
Make no mistake, many employees have remained with the same physician 
throughout the reimbursement transformation.  However, in early stages, an 
incentive existed to provide the best possible care because health-care 
primarily focused on the patient’s health and secondarily on maintaining the 
physician’s practice and reputation.  Critics argue that the incentive 
encouraged too much care and utter disregard for expenses.  The institution of 
managed care changed the health-care landscape because it placed the risk of 
 
 1. Oath of Hippocrates as adopted by SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, 
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/5594.html (last modified Mar. 7, 2002) 
(“I will carry out that regimen which, according to my power and discernment, shall be for the 
benefit of my patients; I will keep them from harm and wrong . . . I will maintain the utmost 
respect for all human life.”). 
 2. Jeff is a fictional character, not intended to represent any one individual. 
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loss and burden for “unnecessary” treatment on the physician.  Today, 
physicians not only worry about the patient’s ailments but also must juggle 
multiple burdens that impact the physician’s own well-being. 
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO)3 serve a dual purpose in that 
they provide insurance and medical care under the theory that providing both 
services through one entity encourages efficient use of scarce health-care 
resources.  HMOs commonly “encourage” their physicians to make decisions 
that reduce costs to the HMO.  Upon meeting objectives set by the HMO, 
physicians receive a pecuniary bonus or incentive that may introduce 
competing, if not adverse, interests affecting the physician’s treatment 
decisions.  The question therefore arises as to whether HMOs should be liable 
for concealing information about physician reimbursement incentives while 
shifting risk and burdens to physicians, all for the sake of profit. 
In June 2003, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued the most recent 
appellate decision regarding the extent to which disclosure requirements under 
ERISA obligate an HMO to disclose financial incentives awarded to 
physicians, Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan East, Inc.4  Horvath involved a 
beneficiary challenging disclosure practices of her HMO, alleging that 
nondisclosure at enrollment and continued concealment of physician incentives 
violated ERISA disclosure rules and diminished the value of the health plan to 
employees (i.e., a diminished value theory).5  Horvath urged the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals to expand the disclosure requirements under ERISA one step 
further than courts had previously been willing to go, but the court rejected 
Horvath’s claim because it found that controlling exploding health-care costs 
outweighed the protection that might be derived from expanding existing 
ERISA disclosure rules. 
Any examination of health law issues necessarily involves a consideration 
of three elements permeating the analysis: access, cost, and quality.  Adjusting 
practice toward one factor may adversely affect the others.  Part II of this 
Comment will examine cost issues and the historical methods used in health-
care reimbursement that may include “out-of-pocket [expenditures], individual 
health insurance, employment-based health insurance, and government 
financing.”6  Each of these methods “attempted to solve the problem of 
unaffordable care for certain groups,” but like using your fingers to plug a 
dam, each attempt created new problems that contributed to the rapid increases 
 
 3. An HMO is “[a] group of participating healthcare providers that furnish medical services 
to enrolled members of a group health-insurance plan.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 737 (8th ed. 
2004). 
 4. 333 F.3d 450 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 5. Id. at 453. 
 6. Thomas Bodenheimer & Kevin Grumbach, Reimbursing Physicians and Hospitals, 272 
JAMA 971, 971 (1994). 
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in health-care costs.7  Sometimes inadvertently, but often intentionally, 
traditional third-party payment systems created incentives to provide more 
care, but payors sought to mold the behavior of the health-care providers.  Part 
III will examine quality issues through non-legal data such as survey and study 
results examining physician and patient perceptions toward managed care 
reimbursement.  This Part reveals uneasiness, not necessarily toward the 
reimbursement system, but toward the effects incentives have on physician 
autonomy and patient trust.  The discussion in Part IV focuses on statutory 
ERISA analysis and common law clarifications for evaluating ERISA conflict 
preemption and complete preemption for claims to recover benefits due under 
an employee benefit plan (EBP).8  This section also examines common law and 
statutory fiduciary relationships9 and the reasoning as to why HMOs, unlike 
traditional insurance, may be regulated as an ERISA fiduciary. 
Part V focuses the ERISA discussion by analyzing cases that have reached 
the appellate level on incentive disclosure issues.  United States Courts of 
Appeals disagree about a fiduciary’s duties to disclose under ERISA.  The 
cases are Shea v. Esensten,10 McDonald v. Provident Indemnity Life Insurance 
Co.,11 Ehlmann v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Texas,12 and Horvath v. 
Keystone Health Plan East, Inc.13  Part VI analyzes the ramifications of these 
four decisions and the additional insight that Horvath brings to an issue that 
will likely be resolved by the Supreme Court in the not-so-distant future.  
Finally, a brief conclusion addresses the balance that must be struck between 
the social desire to keep health-care costs down contrasted with the risk of 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Employee benefit plans covered by ERISA encompass “written stock-purchase, savings, 
option, bonus, stock- appreciation, profit-sharing, thrift, incentive, pension, or similar plan solely 
for employees, officers, and advisers of a company.  The term includes an employee-welfare 
benefit plan, an employee-pension benefit plan, or a combination of those two.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 564 (8th ed. 2004). 
 9. A fiduciary relationship is: 
A relationship in which one person is under a duty to act for the benefit of another on 
matters within the scope of the relationship.  Fiduciary relationships—such as trustee-
beneficiary, guardian-ward, principal-agent, and attorney-client—require an unusually 
high degree of care.  Fiduciary relationships usu[ally] arise in one of four situations: (1) 
when one person places trust in the faithful integrity of another, who as a result gains 
superiority or influence over the first, (2) when one person assumes control and 
responsibility over another, (3) when one person has a duty to act for or give advice to 
another on matters falling within the scope of the relationship, or (4) when there is a 
specific relationship that has traditionally been recognized as involving fiduciary 
duties . . . . 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1315 (8th ed. 2004). 
 10. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 11. 60 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 12. 198 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 13. 333 F.3d 450 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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having uninformed consumers overpaying for coverage and receiving less than 
ideal benefits from their HMO. 
II.  INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH-CARE REIMBURSEMENT 
A. Traditional Health-Care Reimbursement Structure 
In the current health-care market, Preferred Provider Organizations 
(PPO)14 enroll about half of all employees.15  HMOs provide coverage to 
twenty-six percent of employees, while indemnity insurance covers only five 
percent.16  HMOs exist to provide cost-efficient health care by supplying the 
insurance, acting as administrator, and ultimately supplying medical services.  
Typically, HMOs provide an employer with a plan for group coverage, with 
premium payments being withheld from employees’ salaries.  The relationship 
between employer and HMO is the focus of this paper. 
Physician reimbursement is nearly always determined by contract in one of 
a number of combinations between doctor, hospital and/or managed care 
organization.  Prior to the rise of third-party insurance, physicians and 
hospitals were paid under a “charged based” system, by which reimbursement 
was paid for the services performed on a sliding scale, usually depending on 
ability to pay.17  The expansion of health-care coverage following World War 
II fostered the growth of private insurance, Blue Cross, and Blue Shield.18  In 
the 1950s, the “Blues” attempted to regulate health-care costs by shifting from 
a “charges” system to a system based on “usual, customary, and reasonable 
reimbursement” (UCR), which paid the lowest of: 1) the actual bill charged to 
patient (usual), 2) physician’s customary charge (customary), or 3) the 
prevailing charge in that industry in that community (reasonable).19  In 1965, 
Medicare and Medicaid adopted UCR reimbursement, but they have since 
abandoned the system because the incentive under a UCR reimbursement 
 
 14. A PPO is “[a] group of healthcare providers (such as doctors, hospitals, and pharmacies) 
that agree to provide medical services at a discounted cost to covered persons in a given 
geographic area.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1217 (8th ed. 2004). 
 15. HEALTH & RESEARCH EDUC. TRUST, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH 
BENEFITS: 2002 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 3 (2002) [hereinafter EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS]. 
 16. Id. at 4. 
 17. See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 
310 (1982). 
 18. See id. at 310–11.  Blue Cross provided community insurance plans that covered hospital 
charges.  Id. at 313–14.  Blue Shield provided insurance coverage for physician services.  Id. 
 19. Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-4(a)–(j) (2000); see 
also ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 13 (1997). 
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scheme encourages providers to continually increase actual charges, resulting 
in inflated customary and reasonable charges.20 
The next financing development implemented fee schedules to pay 
physicians per procedure.21  Physicians submit bills under CPT codes,22 while 
hospitals use DRG codes.23  Reimbursement is rendered for procedures, 
regardless of whether the procedure was performed by a general practitioner or 
a specialist.  Under DRGs the incentive is to release the patient as early as 
possible, while maintaining the proper standard of care.24  Lump sum payments 
encourage efficient treatment because reimbursement is the same whether the 
patient stays hospitalized for a week or a few hours.  In 1992, Medicare 
implemented payment for physician services based on a Resource-Based 
Relative Value Scale (RBRVS), which pays on a fee-for-service basis by 
establishing “a fee schedule for different classes of services adjusted 
[geographically].”25  Fee-for-service reimbursement such as CPT, DRG, and 
RBRVS remain useful forms of reimbursement for non-managed care patients. 
B. Managed Care Reimbursement 
Managed Care Organizations (MCOs)26 proliferated in the 1980s and 
1990s because of attempts by the insurance industry to contain exploding 
costs.27  MCOs implemented three major organizational forms: fee-for-service 
with utilization review, Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), and Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs).28  HMOs constitute the most common 
form of managed care and are characterized as insurers attempting to manage 
 
 20. Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians, 22 
AM. J.L. & MED. 399, 400 (1996). 
 21. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(c)(2)(C) (billing based on time, intensity, skill, and stress 
required by the physician to determine payment for a specific treatment). 
 22. “Current Procedural Terminology” is “[a] medical code set of physician and other 
services, maintained and copyrighted by the American Medical Association (AMA), and adopted 
by the Secretary of HHS as the standard for reporting physician and other services on standard 
transactions.”  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., GLOSSARY, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/glossary (last modified July 16, 2004). 
 23. “Diagnosis-Related Groups” is “[a] classification system that groups patients according 
to diagnosis, type of treatment, age, and other relevant criteria. Under the prospective payment 
system, hospitals are paid a set fee for treating patients in a single DRG category, regardless of 
the actual cost of care for the individual.”  Id. 
 24. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 693–698 (4th ed. 2001).  
 25. Latham, supra note 20, at 400 n.5. 
 26. “Managed Care Organizations” (MCO) is an umbrella term for several types of managed 
care organizations including Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO), Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMO), and Point of Service Option (PSO).  See FURROW, supra note 24, at 509–
12; See also Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 6, at 971. 
 27. See generally Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
 28. Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 6, at 971. 
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physician behavior through implementation of measures to control costs and 
limit utilization of medical services.29 
To understand the dynamics in managed care it is necessary to realize that 
the largest third of managed care companies enroll eighty-one percent of the 
HMO beneficiaries, while the smallest third enrolls only three percent of 
beneficiaries.30  HMOs reimburse providers most often using capitation, but 
other forms include negotiated fee-for-service arrangements, global budgets,31 
and staff models.32 
1. The Preferred Form of Managed Care Reimbursement: Capitation 
Payments 
All managed care organizations depend on influencing physician practice, 
either directly or indirectly through physician medical directors.33  HMOs 
spread financial risk by implementing capitation payment systems, by which 
providers are paid per enrollee for a specific period, regardless of services 
rendered.34  Physicians receive the same payment per patient even if no 
services are rendered during a period.35  Capitation in any form encourages 
physicians to accept healthy patients who require little maintenance and to 
avoid high risk/high cost patients.36  To control costs, patients are often 
required to funnel all non-emergency care through the primary care physician, 
who acts as a gatekeeper, determining when to refer the patient for specialist or 
hospital care.37  Capitation payments may be distributed through either a two 
or three-tiered reimbursement structure. 
Capitation payments under a two-tiered reimbursement system38 are 
established by contract between the HMO and individual physician by which 
the physician receives a fixed payment for each patient under his care enrolled 
with the HMO, regardless of services rendered.39  Two-tiered capitation 
transfers financial risk to the health-care provider because the HMO is only 
 
 29. Latham, supra note 20, at 401.   
 30. See Joseph P. Newhouse & The Harvard Managed Care Industry Center Group, 
Managed Care: An Industry Snapshot, 39 INQUIRY: THE J. OF HEALTH CARE ORG., PROVISION, 
AND FIN. 1, 11 (2002). 
 31. The HMO pays one lump sum payment per period and the physician is responsible for 
keeping costs under the global budget.  See Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 6, at 976. 
 32. Staff model HMOs constitute a smaller percentage of managed care whereby physicians 
are salaried employees of the HMO.  Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 6, at 971, 975. 
 33. See generally Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
 34. See Latham, supra note 20, at 401. 
 35. See id. at 402. 
 36. See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 218–19. 
 37. Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 6, at 973. 
 38. Id. (discussing that two-tiered capitation accounts for approximately twenty percent of 
U.S. HMO plans). 
 39. Id. 
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responsible for capitation payments, subject to a few exceptions.40  “Generally, 
a dollar limit is placed on the physician’s risk such that excessive costs for an 
extremely ill patient are covered by the HMO.”41  Two-tiered reimbursement 
creates the most opportunity for conflicts of interest between physician and 
patient because the physician’s personal income is directly proportional to the 
amount of services he denies to patients.42 
In three-tiered reimbursement systems, individual physicians join together 
to create an Independent Practice Association (IPA), and the HMO pays a 
lump sum to the IPA each period.43  Three-tier capitation reduces risk to 
individual providers because the IPA allocates payment into two funds: 
primary care services and hospitalization/specialty services.44  Providers 
receive capitated payments for their primary practice based on the number of 
enrollees, but “[t]he lower the use of diagnostic and specialist services, the 
higher the year-end bonus for IPA physician gatekeepers.”45  Funds remaining 
in the specialist’s fund at the end of a period are disbursed among providers as 
a bonus, returned withholdings, or profit sharing. 
Three-tier systems create fewer opportunities for conflicts of interest than 
two-tier systems because outlier patients are absorbed into the risk pool and do 
not wreak financial havoc on the individual physician’s personal welfare, only 
his year-end bonus.46  Compared to two-tier capitation, three-tier capitation 
creates a lesser conflict of interest because usually less than twenty percent of 
the physician’s income depends on the amount of diagnostic and specialty 
services utilized during the year.47 
Results vary widely for capitation-based practices depending on the 
number of physicians in the plan, contract language, size and demographic of 
population served, geographic location, and utilization of resources.48  Reports 
indicate that proper utilization of capitated payments allowed physician groups 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 6, at 973. 
 43. Cicio v. Does 1–8, 321 F.3d 83, 87 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003).  The Cicio court defined an 
independent practice association as: 
[A] local physician group . . . comprised of physicians who are active on [a] hospital’s 
medical staff and contract with a health maintenance organization . . . . [where] 
physicians’ services are established with a relatively large number of generally small or 
medium-sized group practices, with physicians receiving some type of discounted fee-for-
service payment from the HMO, rather than . . . salaried reimbursement. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 44. Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 6, at 974.   
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  
 47. See generally id. 
 48. See generally Steven D. Pearson et al., Ethical Guidelines for Physician Compensation 
Based on Capitation, 339 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 689 (1998). 
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switching to capitated reimbursement to increase their income, in one year, to 
150–170% of the amount they had earned caring for the same patients under 
fee-for-service systems.49 
2. How Physician Financial Incentives Work 
In order to encourage physicians to internalize costs for services and 
referrals, HMOs implement three major types of incentives: bonuses, 
withholds, and subcapitation.50  Financial incentives accompanying capitation 
vary depending on the HMO and individual plan.  Physicians receive bonuses, 
the most common incentive type, for “good case-management technique,” by 
which physicians may be rated in any number of categories including cost-
efficiency, patient satisfaction, hours, patient encounters, and malpractice 
experience.51  Withhold systems can vary widely but generally retain a 
percentage of the capitated payment in a risk pool at the beginning of the 
period that is used to pay for referrals and services beyond the capitated 
budget.52  In 1996, seventy-two percent of network and IPA model HMOs 
utilized bonuses or withholds to pay their primary care physicians.53  
Subcapitation systems constitute the most complex incentives because 
physicians (in groups or individually) contract with service providers 
(laboratories, physical therapy) to provide all services at a fixed cost.54 
The optimal incentive should be structured to avoid intense conflicts of 
interest while making physicians more cost-conscious in diagnosis and 
treatment.55  Several factors help determine intensity, including scope of 
services included in the incentive, amount of potential financial gain or loss, 
timing of the incentive, structure, and “stop-loss”56 provisions.57  Intensity of 
 
 49. Ken Terry, Surprise! Capitation Can Be a Boon, MED. ECON., Apr. 15, 1996, at 127–28.  
See also Pearson, supra note 48, at 690. 
 50. Latham, supra note 20, at 403. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 404 (discussing increased effectiveness of withholds where the physician is 
personally responsible for costs above the withhold); but cf. GERALD R. PETERS, HEALTHCARE 
INTEGRATION: A LEGAL MANUAL FOR CONSTRUCTING INTEGRATED ORGANIZATIONS 420, 421, 
424 (1995) (asserting that physicians have “more incentive to perform services than to manage 
care” when they can charge fees to the withhold without internalizing the cost). 
 53. Latham, supra note 20, at 405 (citing PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REV. COMM’N, 1995 
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, reprinted in MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) No. 847, 
extra ed., pt. 2, at 231–232 (1995)). 
 54. Latham, supra note 20, at 404–05. 
 55. See Pearson, supra note 48, at 692–93. 
 56. “Stop-loss” refers to a limit on financial risk of an individual physician or a physician 
group accrued in caring for outlier patients with unusually high medical costs.  Id. at 689.  See 
also Latham, supra note 20, at 407. 
 57. Pearson, supra note 48, at 689. 
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incentives can affect the magnitude of physicians’ conflicts of interest.58  A 
survey of HMO managers found that incentives constituting twenty-five 
percent of a physician’s income created an extreme conflict of interest, but a 
five to fifteen percent incentive could achieve desired outcomes without 
compromising physicians’ judgment.59 
Incentives play an important role for budgetary and cost reduction reasons.  
Budget withholdings allow HMOs and IPAs to estimate earnings and 
efficiently utilize resources over long periods.  Incentives force physicians to 
internalize the cost consequences of their decisions while maintaining 
physician autonomy in treatment of individual patients. 
III.  PERCEPTIONS ABOUT PHYSICIAN FINANCIAL INCENTIVE PROGRAMS 
“It is well accepted that patients deserve medical opinions about treatment 
plans and referrals unsullied by conflicting motives.”60  Ethically, medicine is 
founded on the collective belief that physicians are competent, compassionate 
professionals, acting solely for their patients’ best interests.61  However, in a 
market system, medical resources are scarce, and physicians must treat wisely.  
Critics of incentive programs argue that paying physicians more to do less may 
create an irresistible temptation.62 
The federal government seeks to protect consumers by providing 
information to encourage informed decision making.63  In 1996, President 
Clinton created the Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality 
in the Health Care Industry [hereinafter Commission], which advised the 
President on changes in the health-care system and recommended measures “to 
promote and assure health care quality and value, and protect consumers and 
workers in the health care system.”64  The Commission submitted the 
Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibilities to the President recommending 
required disclosure of “network characteristics”65 and “procedures that govern 
 
 58. See Alan L. Hillman et al., HMO Managers’ Views On Financial Incentives and Quality, 
HEALTH AFF., Winter 1991, at 210.  
 59. Pearson, supra note 48, at 691. 
 60. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CURRENT OPINIONS 
OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION 1986, § 8.06, at 31 (requiring the patient’s best interests to be the physician’s 
primary concern), available at http://www.ama-assn.org. 
 61. Pearson, supra note 48, at 689.  See also supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 62. Pearson, supra note 48, at 689. 
 63. HEALTH, EDUC., AND HUMAN SERV. DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. 
HEHS-98-137, CONSUMER HEALTH CARE INFORMATION: MANY QUALITY COMMISSION 
DISCLOSURE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE NOT CURRENT PRACTICE 4 (1998) [hereinafter 
CONSUMER HEALTH CARE INFORMATION]. 
 64. Exec. Order No. 13,017, 61 Fed. Reg. 47,659 (Sept. 5, 1996). 
 65. “Network Characteristics” consist of “[p]rovider compensation methods, including base 
payment (e.g., capitation, salary, fee schedule) and additional financial incentives (e.g., bonus, 
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access to specialists.”66  The Commission advocated disclosure to entitle 
consumers to “receive accurate, easily understood information and . . . 
assistance in making informed health care decisions about their health plans, 
professionals and facilities.”67 
Disclosure regulation became more frequent in the 1990s as the health 
insurance industry rapidly changed and regulators sought accountability 
through disclosure.68  The Commission found that market-based and ethical 
reasons should govern disclosure because value-based purchasing enables 
consumers to maximize their dollar by seeking the highest quality care at the 
lowest price.69  Patients and providers require disclosure because they rely on 
plan information in decision making that directly affects the consumer’s life 
and health.70 
Disclosure is an effective regulatory strategy to expose conflicts of interest 
when intermediaries or agents are involved.71  The greatest disagreement 
between health-care providers and plan providers arises over business 
relationships and financial arrangements.72  In a 1998 report to selected 
Senators, the GAO found that large employers disclosed about half the 
information recommended by the Commission but did not disclose physician 
incentives in plan enrollment material.73  Health plan providers usually resist 
disclosure because they view utilization review and physician incentives as 
proprietary information.74 
 
withholds, etc.).”  ADVISORY COMM’N ON CONSUMER PROT. & QUALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE 
INDUS., CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 1, at http://www.hcquality 
commission.gov/final (last modified June 24, 1998) [hereinafter CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES].  See also CONSUMER HEALTH CARE INFORMATION, supra note 63, at 7–8. 
 66. CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 65 at 1. 
 67. Id.   
 68. See Tracy E. Miller & William M. Sage, Disclosing Physician Financial Incentives, 281 
JAMA 1424, 1424 (1999).  See also CONSUMER HEALTH CARE INFORMATION, supra note 63, at 
1. 
 69. CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 65 at 1. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Miller & Sage, supra note 68, at 1424–25 (advocating mandatory disclosure only when a 
market failure results from “incomplete or asymmetric information,” the information would be 
useful to consumers when making health-care choices, and barriers exist to restrict the voluntary 
disclosure). 
 72. CONSUMER HEALTH CARE INFORMATION, supra note 63, at 6–7. 
 73. Id. at 6. 
 74. Miller & Sage, supra note 68, at 1425. 
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A. Patients’ Views are Mixed About the Financial Incentive Plans 
The public’s misgivings about managed care focus on “the fear that patient 
care is influenced by financial incentives.”75  Even though physician financial 
incentives may not affect the actual administration of care, it may negatively 
affect the patient’s overall perception of health-care quality.76 
The opportunity for or mere appearance of conflict of interest reduces 
patient trust and causes patients to scrutinize and second-guess their 
physicians’ decisions.77  “Regardless of payment method, patients’ trust in 
their health plan or HMOs was lower than trust in their physicians.”78  
Patients’ trust in their HMO is closely correlated with trust in their physician.79 
A study of patient and doctor opinions of financial incentive plans in the 
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) found “the adverse 
impact of capitation on patient trust may be partially due to differences in 
physician behavior.”80  The JAMA study found that the presence of financial 
incentives enhances “discordance between patients’ experience and 
expectations” and may reduce trust in their physician, regardless of whether 
incentives encouraged more appropriate uses of medical services.81  A study in 
the Archives of Internal Medicine confirmed the JAMA study results, finding 
that although forty-six percent of patients surveyed were uncomfortable with 
group capitation, trust in their primary care physician was not reduced by such 
knowledge.82 
Not only patients but also Congress and consumer rights groups advocate 
for greater disclosure to facilitate informed decision making by consumers.83  
However, it is important to note that “consumer satisfaction may not always 
 
 75. Julie Appleby, Kaiser to Reveal Incentives for Physicians; Bonuses for Limiting 
Appointments Dropped, USA TODAY: MONEY, Jan. 24, 2003. 
 76. Anne G. Pereira & Steven D. Pearson, Patient Attitudes Toward Physician Financial 
Incentives, 161 ARCHIVE OF INTERNAL MED. 1313, 1313 (2001). 
 77. See id. 
 78. Audiey C. Kao et al., The Relationship Between Method of Physician Payment and 
Patient Trust, 280 JAMA 1708, 1711 (1998) (finding no association between patients’ trust and 
their perception of capitation compared to fee-for-service payments). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1712. 
 81. Id. at 1713; but see Mark A. Hall et al., How Disclosing HMO Physician Incentives 
Affects Trust, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 197, 204 (finding that disclosure of the mere 
existence of financial incentives negatively affected patients’ perceptions, but when patients 
understood the content of disclosure, their perceptions were positively affected). 
 82. Pereira & Pearson, supra note 76, at 1316. 
 83. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997) (containing 
a list of disclosure requirements for private insurers under Medicare + Choice plans).  See also 
CONSUMER HEALTH CARE INFORMATION, supra note 63, at 5. 
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correlate with achievement of the desired clinical outcome.”84  Incentive 
proponents argue that incentives are often complicated and disclosure only 
distorts the patient’s understanding of complex health-care financing.85  
Experts advocate disclosure in some form but disagree about its effectiveness 
because of the difficulty of conveying complex information and measuring 
patient reaction to potentially controversial payment structures.86  Knowledge 
of positive incentives may dispel negative opinions, 87 but it also risks blurring 
the fiduciary relationship between physician and patient because patients know 
their physicians are acting with more than one loyalty. 
Patients tended to be more satisfied with the non-financial aspects of fee-
for-service coverage88 but preferred the smaller co-pays and deductibles of 
HMOs.89  The potential conflict of interest bothered patients most.90  
Ultimately, patients’ concerns about premiums and covered benefits 
outweighed misgivings regarding payment method and referral policies until 
they contracted a serious illness or required expensive procedures.91 
B. Physician Autonomy Constrained by Financial Incentives 
Not only are patients less satisfied, but physicians feel their ability to treat 
patients, using their best judgment, is reduced in capitated systems.92  
Physician financial incentives present the opportunity for conflicts of interest 
in that the physician’s professional medical judgment may become clouded by 
financial self-interest.93  The physician-patient relationship often facilitates an 
atmosphere where the patient is reluctant to initiate conflict or question the 
physician’s judgment because the patient must rely on the physician’s 
professional medical judgment.94  In the physician-patient fiduciary 
 
 84. R. Adams Dudley et al., The Impact of Financial Incentives on Quality of Health Care, 
76 MILBANK Q. 649, 651 (1998). 
 85. See generally Hall, supra note 81, at 204. 
 86. Id. at 202. 
 87. See id. at 203.  In January 2003, Kaiser Permanente, the largest managed care provider in 
the country, agreed to disclose clinical guidelines for treating certain conditions and physician 
compensation—including physician financial incentives to limit care—as part of a legal 
settlement.  Laura B. Benko, A Look Inside: Settlement Requires Kaiser Permanente to Publish 
Info on Doc’s Decisionmaking, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jan. 27, 2003, at 8. 
 88. Non-financial aspects of fee-for-service coverage include: choice of provider, no 
network restrictions, and personal relationship with primary-care physician. 
 89. Dudley, supra note 84, at 673. 
 90. Pereira & Pearson, supra note 76, at 1316. 
 91. Audiey C. Kao et al., Physician Incentives and Disclosure of Payment Methods to 
Patients, 16 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 181, 186 (2001). 
 92. Kao, supra note 78, at 1712. 
 93. See Miller & Sage, supra note 68, at 1425. 
 94. See id. 
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relationship, the physician is obligated to “act exclusively in [the] patients’ 
interests” and “to respect the patients’ autonomy.”95 
Primary care physicians reported that quality of care provided “through 
capitated contracts is inferior to the care” provided under “other forms of 
insurance.”96  The success of physician financial incentive plans may rest in 
the contract language that binds primary care physicians’ interests to the HMO 
instead of the patient’s welfare.  One plan required physicians “not to take any 
action . . . which undermines . . . confidence of enrollees.”97  Yet the next 
paragraph of the contract required physicians to “keep the Proprietary 
Information [payment rates, utilization-review procedures, incentives, etc.] and 
this Agreement strictly confidential.”98 
In reality, physicians feel restricted by malpractice fears rather than 
payment systems.  Physicians are worried about making the correct diagnosis 
and cannot keep straight which patients are managed care and which are fee-
for-service.  Few physicians contract with only one payor and accordingly 
accept a medley of payment options.99  Physicians often experience four to five 
distinct types of third-party reimbursement in a typical day and may spend 
minimal time with each patient.100  In practice, physicians treat a variety of fee-
for-service, government supported, and capitation arrangements in the same 
day.  Keeping up with which patients are capitated may be a daunting task and 
one which the physician chooses to avoid completely. 
The effects of outliers in one plan can be reduced by increasing the 
incentive time period or increasing the number of patients or physicians 
calculated in the incentive.101  If incentives are paid less often, physicians feel 
the incentive to ration treatment less intensely with each patient.102  As much 
as providers and consumers dislike capitation, it is unlikely to be abandoned in 
a market-driven health-care system with limited resources.103 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF ERISA PROVISIONS 
In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Investment Securities 
Act (ERISA) to establish uniform standards for employee benefit plans. 104  
 
 95. Id.  See also supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 96. Dudley, supra note 84, at 657. 
 97. Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Extreme Risk — The New Corporate 
Proposition for Physicians, 333 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1706, 1706 (1995). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 6, at 971. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Latham, supra note 20, at 410. 
 102. See id. 
 103. Pearson, supra note 48, at 689. 
 104. Employee Retirement Investment Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000) [hereinafter 
ERISA]. 
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Concerned that multi-state employers would be subjected to widely varying 
obligations, Congress established uniform regulation under ERISA.105  With 
ERISA’s enactment, Congress sought to promote judicial efficiency and 
economic stability because federal and state laws messily interact in the area of 
employee benefits.106 
The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause provides that federal law supercedes 
state law when Congress so desires.107  Congress may pre-empt all state law in 
an area by expressing intent to completely exclude all others from regulating in 
that area.108  However, the federal and state laws often coexist when Congress’ 
intent is unclear or it does not completely pre-empt a field.  The Court 
presumes that Congress does not intend to pre-empt state legislation unless 
there is a clear indication from the language of the statute or purposes of the 
federal action.109  Although Congress rarely expresses intent to pre-empt 
existing state law, parts of ERISA completely pre-empt state law, while others 
coexist in relative harmony.110 
A. Fiduciary Relationships Under Common Law 
Trust plays a very important role in medical relationships, setting the stage 
for every treatment decision.111  At common law, a trustee “is not permitted to 
place himself in a position where it would be for his own benefit to violate his 
duty to the beneficiaries.”112  Trust between physician and patient is more 
complex than other fiduciary relationships113 because treatment decisions may 
affect the patient’s survival or long-term health.114  At common law, all 
fiduciary obligations were imposed on physicians, including requirements to: 
disclose material information, use good faith and fair dealings with patients, 
maintain confidentiality, provide notice to terminate the relationship, and avoid 
divided loyalty.115  The physician-patient relationship embodies the definition 
 
 105. See id.  See also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990). 
 106. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1001; GARY CLAXTON, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HOW 
PRIVATE INSURANCE WORKS: A PRIMER 7 (2002). 
 107. See U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 148, 157 (1978). 
 110. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1132, 1144 (2000); see also CLAXTON, supra note 106, at 7 
(discussing the nature of interaction between federal and state law regarding employee benefits). 
 111. Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 485 (2002); see also 
David Mechanic, The Functions and Limitations of Trust in the Provision of Medical Care, 23 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 661, 661–62 (1998). 
 112. 2A AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170, at 311 
(4th ed. 1987). 
 113. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 114. See generally Hall, supra note 111, at 485. 
 115. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996) (discussing fiduciary’s responsibility to 
disclose material information and use good faith and fair dealing with beneficiary); Hammonds v. 
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of trust-based relationships because the physician possesses knowledge to act 
in the patient’s best interest and the patient may be none the wiser if the 
physician breaches the fiduciary relationship.116 
Courts must be careful to maintain a high level of trust between physician 
and patient.  Courts can view the effect of trust on law in three categories: 
predicated, supportive, and skeptical.117  In a predicated view, trust is a factual 
premise used to impose a particular rule.118  However, when implementing the 
supportive attitude toward trust, courts “attempt to increase or sustain trust.”119  
Finally, under the skeptical legal attitude, courts examine the “absence or 
illegitimacy of trust” to establish a legal system institutionalizing distrust.120 
Courts seek to regulate trustworthiness of physicians and institutions more 
than influencing patients’ trust.121  Conflicts of interest created by HMO 
reimbursement systems raise three trust-related legal issues.  Under Hall’s 
predicated theory, “the law might view patient trust as creating a fiduciary 
relationship in which doctors have a duty to avoid or disclose financial 
conflicts of interest, in order to justify the level of trust that exists.”122  The 
existence of a fiduciary relationship causes the obligation to disclose to “flow 
automatically,” regardless of positive or negative outcomes associated with 
disclosure.123  Implementing a “supportive view” of incentives, a functionalist 
 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (discussing rules for termination of 
fiduciary relationship); McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 
1995) (explaining the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty to the beneficiary); Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. 
Supp. 463, 469 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 116. See Susan Dorr Goold, Money and Trust: Relationships Between Patients, Physicians, 
and Health Plans, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 687, 687 (1998). 
Typically, vulnerability, dependence, and reliance on the part of trustors force them or 
cause them to choose to trust the trustee. There is a trust object with which the trustee is 
entrusted: one’s health, life, well-being, or children.  There are expectations of 
competence or good outcome, and expectations of agency, beneficence, and good will that 
apply to the trustee. The trustee, for her part, must accept the trusting relationship and the 
discretionary power and control that comes with it. With this acceptance come moral 
obligations of competence, agency, and good will. 
Id. 
 117. Hall, supra note 111, at 486. 
 118. Id. (discussing predicated attitudes focused on formalistic reasoning based on the 
existence of trust and disregarding the effects of trust). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 504 (finding that “[t]rust . . . is an attitude about motivations and expected 
outcomes” held by the patient, but trustworthiness refers to behavior of physicians and 
institutions). 
 122. Hall, supra note 111, at 486.  “Trust predicates law in a justificatory mode by creating 
legal rules to vindicate the level of trust that exists or to punish violations of that trust.  In the 
syllogistic mode, legal doctrine arises axiomatically from the existence of trust, through the 
application of precedents and principles from fiduciary law.”  Id. 
 123. Id. at 486. 
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court might limit incentives or mandate disclosure because “conflicts of 
interest created by cost-containment incentives tend to weaken trust by causing 
patients . . .  to question their doctors’ motivations.”124  From a skeptical 
viewpoint, it appears that patients’ trust is unlikely to be maintained in the 
presence of financial conflicts of interest.125 
B. Fiduciary Relationships Under ERISA 
Congress adopted the scope of fiduciary responsibilities in ERISA to 
govern employee benefit plan126 administration from the common law of 
trusts.127  An individual is a fiduciary under ERISA if he “exercises any 
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such 
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or 
disposition of its assets,” or “has any discretionary authority or discretionary 
responsibility in the administration of such plan.”128  ERISA mandates that 
private pension plan investments are to be held in trust,129 used for the 
exclusive benefit of plan beneficiaries, and administered by one or more 
named fiduciaries.130  However, ERISA fiduciary rules focus more on the 
employer, insurance provider, or managed care organization than the 
physician-patient relationship and “[u]nder ERISA . . . a fiduciary may have 
financial interests adverse to beneficiaries.”131 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id.  “Disclosure in such a case would serve as a warning to patients, putting them on 
guard about how financial incentives might distort or corrupt their physicians’ medical 
judgments.” Id. 
 126. Employee benefit plans as defined by ERISA include: 
[A]ny plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an employer . . . to the 
extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of 
providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or 
otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of 
sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship 
or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal 
services. 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000).  See also McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234, 
236 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 127. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 11–13 (1973). 
 128. ERISA § 402(21)(A) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2000)).  A plan 
fiduciary need not be a third party and can be an officer, employee, or other party in interest.  
ERISA § 408(c)(3) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (2000)). 
 129. See ERISA § 403(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2000)). 
 130. See ERISA § 402(a)(1) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000)). 
 131. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 225 (2000) (explaining that employers can be ERISA 
fiduciaries and take actions which disadvantage employees when acting as employers or plan 
beneficiaries). 
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Courts disagree about whether ERISA creates a fiduciary duty for 
managed care organizations to disclose financial incentives.132  In order to 
maintain trustworthiness, ERISA implements a prudent person standard of care 
in plan administration, requiring fiduciaries to discharge duties solely for the 
interests of the plan beneficiaries.133  Fiduciaries must also provide services to 
beneficiaries and defray costs of administering the plan.134  Fiduciaries must 
act with “care, skill, prudence, and diligence” to minimize risk in investments 
and enforce all portions of the benefit plan in compliance with ERISA.135  In 
order for an employee to prove a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, he 
must prove “breach of a fiduciary duty and a prima facie case of loss to the 
[benefit] plan.”136  Finally, plan fiduciaries violating ERISA are personally 
liable to the plan beneficiaries for losses incurred by the breach of duty.137 
C. ERISA Analysis: Created by Congress and Redefined by the Courts 
Two types of pre-emption can occur under ERISA: express pre-emption 
under §514138 and procedural pre-emption under §502.139  ERISA § 514 
requires courts to employ a three step test to determine whether a state law is 
preempted by ERISA and should be removed to federal court.140  ERISA 
analysis contains three major components: A state law is pre-empted if it 
“relate[s] to” an employee benefit plan,141 but it can be “saved” if the claim 
 
 132. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that ERISA § 404 
required managed care organization to disclose physician incentive plan); but see Ehlmann v. 
Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Tex., 198 F.3d 552, 554–56 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding no broad duty 
to disclose for HMOs under ERISA). 
 133. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000). 
 134. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 
170(1) (1959). 
 135. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)–(D). 
 136. McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 137. See ERISA § 409 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2000)). 
 138. ERISA § 514 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000)); see infra note 140 and 
accompanying text. 
 139. ERISA § 502 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000)) (providing a private 
right of action to recover for “benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights 
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan”). 
 140. 29 U.S.C. § 1144. 
 141. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (“provisions of this subchapter . . . shall supersede any and all State 
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan”); Shaw v. Delta 
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1983) (“[a] law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan, in the 
normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan”); see also 
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 722 (1985).  A state law “relates to” an EBP if it 
mandates benefit structure, mandates plan administration, rules out choice of benefit structure or 
administration of an EBP, or mandates alternative enforcement mechanisms beyond those 
provided by ERISA § 502.  See  N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 645–48 (1995) [hereinafter Travelers]. 
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relates to regulation of insurance,142 unless the plan is provided by a self-
insurer, in which case the plan is “deemed” not to be regulated as an insurer.143  
ERISA § 502 is the exclusive remedy “to recover benefits due . . . under the 
terms of his plan.”144 
1. Conflict Preemption — “Relating To” Doctrine 
In 1974, Congress expressed intent to establish uniform regulation of 
employee benefit plans (EBP) by enacting the Employee Retirement 
Investment Securities Act (ERISA).  Congress created ERISA to “minimize 
the administrative and financial burden” faced by large insurers and employers 
and to prevent potential conflicts of substantive law that would require 
manipulating plans to comply with discrepancies in each jurisdiction.145  
Congress used broad language in structuring ERISA to pre-empt all state 
statutes that “relate to” an EBP.146  However, the Supreme Court has 
continually narrowed the scope of ERISA preemption.147 
 
In trying to extrapolate congressional intent in a case like this, when congressional 
language seems simultaneously to preempt everything and hardly anything, we “have no 
choice” but to temper the assumption that “the ordinary meaning . . . accurately expresses 
the legislative purpose” . . . with the qualification “that the historic police powers of the 
States were not [meant] to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress.” 
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 365 (2002) (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 
655) (finding that Illinois’ mandatory external review did not constitute alternative enforcement 
measures to ERISA § 502) (citations omitted).  The courts have continually narrowed the scope 
of automatic pre-emption originally envisioned.  Compare Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 224 
(2000), and Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2001) (holding mixed eligibility and treatment 
decisions as well as strictly treatment decisions are not pre-empted and should be handled through 
state malpractice actions; however, plan coverage decisions are pre-empted), with Estate of 
Frappier v. Wishnov, 678 So. 2d 884 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (allowing vicarious liability 
claims, but pre-empting corporate liability claims), and Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 
350 (3d Cir. 1995) (establishing liability for HMO under ERISA § 502 for insufficient quantity of 
services, but expressing an unwillingness to evaluate the quality of benefits). 
 142. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (“[N]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or 
relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”); 
see also Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 339–342 (2003) (adopting a 
clarified test for determining whether a state law “regulates insurance”). 
 143. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (creating an exception to the insurance saving clause that an 
employer’s self-insured benefit plan may not “be deemed to be an insurance company or other 
insurer . . . or to be engaged in the business of insurance . . . of any law of any State purporting to 
regulate insurance companies, [or] insurance contracts”). 
 144. ERISA § 502 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000)). 
 145. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144). 
 146. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658.  See also supra note 141. 
 147. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (limiting recovery under 
ERISA to remedies outlined by Congress “without embellishment by independent state 
remedies”); McClendon, 498 U.S. at 138; Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146–
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A state-law cause of action is removable when it is based on law that is 
pre-empted by ERISA and falls within the scope of enforceable remedies under 
ERISA § 502 provisions.148  In Travelers, the Court redefined a two-prong 
disjunctive test whereby a state statute triggers ERISA when it expressly 
makes reference to an EBP or has a direct economic “connection with” an 
EBP.149  The Court should look at both Congress’s objectives as to the scope of 
ERISA preemption and to the effect of the state law on ERISA plans.150  In 
Travelers, the Court held that surcharges mandated by New York law on 
commercial insurers, but not Blue Cross/Blue Shield, were not pre-empted 
because the charges only had an indirect economic impact.151  The Blues 
accept patients through open enrollment, some of whom commercial insurers 
would reject.152  Surcharges on commercial insurers and HMOs make the 
Blues a “less unattractive” insurance alternative, and the Court reasoned that 
this indirect economic effect does not have a connection with the uniform 
administration of employee benefit plans.153  The Travelers Court also held 
that state law mandating benefit structure, plan administration, or providing 
alternative remedies to ERISA § 502 would have a connection with employee 
benefit plans and trigger pre-emption.154 
In 2000, the Supreme Court ruled that incentive plans do not violate 
ERISA, but the Court reserved judgment on determining the legality of failures 
to disclose incentives.155  The Court outlined a test to settle disagreement about 
pre-emption of state claims, holding that eligibility decisions are pre-empted, 
but treatment decisions and mixed questions of eligibility and treatment are not 
pre-empted.156  “[I]n the field of health care, a subject of traditional state 
regulation, there is no ERISA preemption without clear manifestation of 
congressional purpose.”157  Herdrich brought claims against Pegram, her 
doctor, alleging medical malpractice, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty under 
 
157 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1983); Rush Prudential HMO, 
Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) (holding that states maintain powers unless Congress 
expresses “clear and manifest purpose” to supercede). 
 148. See 28 U.S.C § 1331; 28 U.S.C § 1441; ERISA § 502 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C 
§ 1132 (2000)); see also Romney v. Lin, 94 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 149. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658. 
 150. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr. N.A., 519 U.S. 316, 
325 (1997). 
 151. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658–59. 
 152. Id. at 658. 
 153. Id. at 659–60. 
 154. Id. at 658; see also Anderson v. Humana, 24 F.3d 889, 891 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
Anderson’s attacks on Humana-Michael Reese’s incentive structure was pre-empted because it 
“relates to” the administration of employer’s benefit plan). 
 155. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000). 
 156. Id. at 231–32. 
 157. Id. at 237. 
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ERISA.158  The Court determined that Dr. Pegram’s decision to delay an 
ultrasound to detect appendicitis was not pre-empted by ERISA because it was 
a mixed question of eligibility and treatment.159 
Applying the Pegram analysis, the Second Circuit held that ERISA does 
not pre-empt a claim challenging an “allegedly flawed medical judgment” 
because review of an individual patient’s symptoms is a question of mixed 
eligibility and treatment.160  Federal courts must tread lightly around state 
medical malpractice law when considering ERISA claims because ERISA’s 
main focus is on protecting contractual rights defined within individual 
employee benefit plans.161 
2. Insurance Savings Clause 
In order to qualify under the ERISA Insurance Saving Clause, a state law 
must be “specifically directed toward” the insurance industry and not merely a 
general law that affects the industry.162  ERISA’s Insurance Saving Clause 
does not “exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which 
regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”163  Prior to 2003, courts applied an 
unworkable test for determining whether a state law “regulates insurance” by 
applying a common-sense definition or examining the McCarran-Ferguson 
criteria.164  Under McCarran-Ferguson, courts found a state law pre-empted if 
it met two of the three McCarran-Ferguson factors: whether the practice—
”transfer[s] or spread[s] a policyholder’s risk; . . .is an integral part of the 
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; . . . [and] is limited to 
entities within the insurance industry.”165 
In 2003, the Court abandoned the McCarran-Ferguson criteria in favor of a 
two-pronged test to redefine the “regulate insurance” clause, holding that the 
scope of the Insurance Savings Clause is “specifically directed toward entities 
engaged in insurance” and “the state law must substantially affect the risk 
pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured.”166  The Supreme 
Court unanimously held that Kentucky’s any willing provider law was not pre-
 
 158. Id. at 215–16. 
 159. Id. at 229, 231 (defining a mixed eligibility and treatment decision as an “eligibility 
decision[] [that] cannot be untangled from physicians’ judgments about reasonable medical 
treatment”). 
 160. Cicio v. Does 1–8 et al., 321 F.3d 83, 102 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 161. Id. at 100. 
 162. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 365–66; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. 
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50 (1987). 
 163. ERISA § 514 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000)). 
 164. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 743 (1985). 
 165. Id. at 743; see also McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1994)). 
 166. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 1479 (2003). 
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empted by ERISA because it was “specifically directed toward entities 
engaged in insurance,” even though the statutes also adversely affected 
physicians from entering into HMO contracts.167 
3. The Deemer Clause 
In the final step of ERISA analysis, a self-insuring company shall be 
“deemed”168 to be exempt from the Insurance Savings clause and not subject to 
state law regulating insurance, banking, and securities.169  The Deemer Clause 
in effect subjects self-insured employers to federal law but exempts them from 
state laws regulating insurers. 
D. Complete/Procedural Pre-emption 
Complete pre-emption under ERISA § 502 arises when a beneficiary seeks 
“to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his 
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits 
under the terms of the plan.”170  Remedies mandated for ERISA plans do not 
allow for tort or punitive damage awards and only allow injunctive relief and 
incidental damages occurring from denial of benefits under an EBP.171  ERISA 
§ 502 requirements172 must be strictly adhered to and will completely pre-empt 
any state law to the contrary, providing a defendant the right to remove to 
federal court if a claim for benefits is filed in state court.173  ERISA plaintiffs 
are not entitled to trial by jury.174 
ERISA § 502 creates statutory legal rights, which when infringed upon 
provide beneficiaries with standing and satisfy the actual or threatened injury 
 
 167. Id. at 1475–76, 1479. 
 168. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). 
 169. A mandatory benefits statute affecting a self-insuring company’s EBP will be pre-
empted because it “relates to” employee benefits.  However, the plan will be “saved” because it 
relates to insurance and will be subject to state statutes.  One further exception exists (the Deemer 
Clause) in that self-insured employers are “deemed” not to be regulated by state statutes as an 
insurance company or under insurance contracts and therefore pre-empted by ERISA.  See 
generally 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000). 
 170. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000)). 
 171. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(A). 
 172. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1)–(2) (2000).  Requirements include: a full and fair internal review 
because an employee has the right to know reasons behind a Managed Care Organization’s 
decision; a written denial explaining the reason; time limits for decisions (Urgent–72 hours, 
Concurrent–sufficiently in advance, Pre-service–15 days, Post-service–30 days); the provision of 
an “Appropriate Health Care Professional” on appeal to aid in decision; and exhaustion of 
internal review before plaintiffs can file a claim in federal court.  Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 
2560.503-1(f)(2)(i)–(iii) (2003). 
 173. 29 U.S.C. § 1132; see also 29 U.S.C § 1441 (2000). 
 174. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). 
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requirement of Article III.175  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals even held 
that plaintiffs do not have to allege actual injuries to prosecute ERISA 
violations because fiduciaries are liable for breaches of duty even when no 
actual injury exists.176  Plaintiffs may seek equitable relief under ERISA § 502 
but may not bring an action for legal relief unless actual harm can be proven.177 
ERISA § 502 requires plaintiffs to exhaust all pre-filing requirements 
before pursuing litigation.178  Plaintiffs possess a statutory right to have a full 
and fair internal review, but if that comes back against the patient, states can 
enact binding external review, which will stand up against ERISA 
preemption.179 
Courts will give deference to plan administrators’ decisions and review § 
502 claims using an arbitrary and capricious standard as long as plan 
administrator is given the discretionary authority to determine or construe the 
terms of the plan.180  However, where a plan administrator has a conflict of 
interest, the court will give less deference and weigh the conflict as a “factor in 
determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.”181  In Doe v. Group 
Hospitalization & Medical Services, Blue Cross administered the benefit plan, 
but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a conflict of interest existed 
because Blue Cross (an insurer) profited less if more medical services were 
approved.182  After determining the existence of a conflict of interest, the court 
looks to see whether the contract is ambiguous.183  If a conflict of interest 
exists and the contract is ambiguous, the court should construe terms in the 
patient’s favor.184 
 
 175. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 176. Ziegler v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 548, 552 (9th Cir. 1990) (“not all ERISA 
actions for breach of fiduciary duties require an occurrence of harm before they will accrue”); see 
also ERISA § 404(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)) (A fiduciary who fails to 
perform for the exclusive benefit of participants violates ERISA). 
 177. Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan E., Inc., 333 F.3d 450, 456 (3d Cir. 2003); see also 
Larson v. Northrop Corp., 21 F.3d 1164, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 178. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)–(b).  Exhaustion of pre-filing requirements entails obtaining written 
denial explaining the reason for denial and a full and fair internal review.  Id.; see also supra note 
172. 
 179. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379–380 (2002) (allowing external 
reviewer to determine what constitutes “medically necessary,” thus providing expanded 
opportunity for recovering on a claim for benefits due under an employee benefits plan, but still 
limited to remedies under ERISA); 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1)–(2) (2000). 
 180. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989) [hereinafter Firestone 
Tire].  However, if deference is not given to the plan administrator, claims will be reviewed de 
novo.  Id. at 115. 
 181. Id. at 115 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959)). 
 182. 3 F.3d 80, 85–87 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 183. Id. at 88–89. 
 184. Id. at 89 (noting that if no conflict of interest exists or the contract is not ambiguous, then 
the plan administrator is given wide discretion and the courts will only review for abuse). 
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V.  CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS DISAGREE ABOUT FIDUCIARIES’ DUTY TO 
DISCLOSE UNDER ERISA 
Whether an HMO has a duty to disclose information regarding physician 
financial incentives and is classified as an ERISA fiduciary depends on the 
contract language of the individual plan and the federal court in which the 
action is initiated. 
A. Cases Finding Requirement in ERISA for HMOs to Disclose Physician 
Financial Incentives as Material Information 
1. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals: Shea v. Esensten 
In 1997, the Eighth Circuit employed a functionalist approach in Shea v. 
Esensten, broadly interpreting the ERISA § 514 “relates to” test.185  Shea’s 
husband died after reporting chest pain to his primary-care physician.186  She 
had standing under ERISA to pursue the claim because Mr. Shea’s employer 
contracted with Seagate HMO to provide medical coverage.187  The physician 
refused to give a referral to a cardiologist even when the decedent offered to 
pay for the visit out of pocket. 
The Shea Court reasoned that the outcome of the case would affect 
administration of the employee benefit plan and accordingly “related to” an 
EBP.188  State laws relating to ERISA must be interpreted broadly and pre-
empted because if administrators have to amend their benefit plans for each 
state, the result would be contrary to Congress’s intent for “nationally uniform 
administration of employee benefit plans.”189 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Seagate HMO breached its 
fiduciary duty because it did not disclose “material information” regarding its 
physician incentive program which encouraged rationing care and minimizing 
specialist referrals.190  “From the patient’s point of view, a financial incentive 
scheme put in place to influence a treating doctor’s referral practices when the 
patient needs specialized care is certainly a material piece of information.”191  
The court reasoned that if Mr. Shea had known his physician was receiving 
 
 185. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914 (1997); 
see also ERISA § 514 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000)). 
 186. Shea, 107 F.3d at 626. 
 187. Id. at 626–27. 
 188. Id. at 627; Jordan v. Fed. Express Corp., 116 F.3d 1005 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that 
breach of fiduciary duty occurs when harm results from non-disclosure material information to 
the beneficiary); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
 189. 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000); see also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 
142 (1990). 
 190. Shea, 107 F.3d at 628.  But see Pegram v. Herdrich 530 U.S. 211, 231 (2000) (discussing 
Congress’ intent for treatment of HMOs in mixed eligibility decisions). 
 191. Shea, 107 F.3d at 628. 
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financial kickbacks for not referring patients to specialists, he would have 
scrutinized his physician’s decision more closely and sought a second 
opinion.192 
The Shea rationale for evaluating ERISA claims survives after Pegram’s 
“mixed eligibility” test because the Eighth Circuit decided this case on the 
basis of the HMO’s fiduciary duties under ERISA § 404.  Shea would no 
longer be viable if the Eighth Circuit had relied on an examination of the 
physician’s treatment decision and the HMOs administrative decision because 
the case would have remained in state court, on the original malpractice 
claims, under the “mixed eligibility” test.193  ERISA issues would then be 
brought into state court actions through supplemental jurisdiction.194  However, 
the Eighth Circuit ruled on fiduciary duty grounds, thus providing multiple 
avenues for holding HMOs liable for nondisclosure under ERISA. 
2. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals: McDonald v. Provident Indemnity 
Life Insurance Co. 
The Fifth Circuit found that fiduciary duties imposed under ERISA § 404 
required disclosure of “material information” such as a change in the plan’s 
rate schedule that resulted in “prohibitive premiums.”195  To prove breach of 
fiduciary duty, the plaintiff must show “a breach of fiduciary duty and a prima 
facie case of loss to the plan.”196  The burden then shifts to the fiduciary to 
prove that losses to the plan were not caused by breach of fiduciary duty.197 
In McDonald, the plaintiff owned a small construction business and 
challenged the premium increases, imposed by the defendant, which forced 
McDonald to cancel coverage for employees.198  French, the fiduciary, 
breached his fiduciary duty when he failed to inform McDonald and its 
employees of rate adjustments planned by Provident, motivated at least in part 
by marketing considerations.199  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that 
 
 192. Id. at 629. 
 193. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 223–24, 231; ERISA § 404 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 
1104(a)(1)(A) (2000)). 
 194. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) and corresponding state statutes. 
 195. McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1995).  “Section 
404(a) imposes on a fiduciary the duty of undivided loyalty to plan participants and beneficiaries, 
as well as a duty to exercise care, skill, prudence and diligence.  An obvious component of those 
responsibilities is the duty to disclose material information.”  Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). 
 196. McDonald, 60 F.3d at 237. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 236. 
 199. Id. at 237. 
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plaintiffs’ claim failed the second step of the analysis because they could not 
prove loss to the plan.200 
B. Cases Finding No Enumerated Duty in ERISA for HMOs to Disclose 
Physician Financial Incentive Plans 
1. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals: Ehlmann v. Kaiser Foundation 
Health Plan of Texas 
In 2000, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a formalistic approach 
in deciding that no duty to disclose physician financial incentives existed under 
ERISA.201  In Ehlmann, the plaintiffs alleged that under ERISA § 404,202 
Congress intended for a disclosure requirement to be imposed on plan 
fiduciaries.203  The Ehlmann Court recognized the issue as one of first 
impression and strictly construed ERISA’s statutory requirements.204  To 
impose such a disclosure requirement would go beyond the scope of duties 
Congress imposed on fiduciaries under ERISA and “this court will not 
encroach on that authority by imposing a duty which Congress has chosen not 
to impose.”205  The Fifth Circuit adopted an expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius rationale in holding that the absence of disclosure requirements shows 
that Congress and the Department of Labor intentionally omitted such 
requirements.206 
The court held that only “material information” must be disclosed to plan 
beneficiaries207 and information regarding a financial incentive plan was not 
considered “material” in the Fifth Circuit. 
 
 200. Id. at 237–38; ERISA § 409(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000)); see 
also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985) (holding that the loss must be 
to the plan and not simply to individual beneficiaries). 
 201. Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Tex., 198 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 202. See ERISA § 404 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000)). 
 203. Ehlmann, 198 F.3d at 555. 
 204. Id. at 554–55.  But see Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 
522 U.S. 914 (1997); Swinney v. General Motors Corp., 46 F.3d 512, 518–19 (6th Cir. 1995); 
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 531–32 (1996). 
 205. Ehlmann, 198 F.3d at 554–55. 
 206. Id. at 555–56.  “A canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing 
implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620–21 (8th 
ed. 2004). 
 207. Compare Ehlmann, 198 F.3d at 556, with Shea, 107 F.3d at 628, and McDonald v. 
Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing between cases 
finding nondisclosure of material information that breached the fiduciary duty and cases lacking a 
specific inquiry or special circumstances to rise to the level of material information warranting 
disclosure). 
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2. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals: Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan 
East 
In June 2003, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued the most recent 
appellate decision, examining a new twist on liability for nondisclosure of 
physician financial incentive plans.  The opinion discussed the extent to which 
ERISA § 404 fiduciary requirements obligate an HMO to disclose financial 
incentives awarded to physicians.208  In Horvath, the plaintiff attempted to 
stretch ERISA’s fiduciary duty requirements one step beyond where courts had 
previously been willing to go.209 
Horvath proceeded, not on the traditional “material information” theory of 
Shea and McDonald,210 but instead sought injunctive relief for disclosure of 
physician financial incentives and restitution or disgorgement for the 
“diminished value” of the employee benefit plan.211  Horvath alleged that 
nondisclosure of Keystone’s physician financial incentives to the plan 
administrator (Horvath) violated the HMOs fiduciary duty to plan members 
under ERISA and that restitution should be awarded for amounts overpaid by 
employees.212  Beneficiaries contested paying into a plan that rewarded 
physicians for rationing treatment while enrollees believed the physicians were 
acting solely for benefit of patients, free from the conflicted influence of 
financial incentives.213  Plaintiffs claimed the cost of the plan was overly 
burdensome considering that physicians were receiving kickbacks to limit 
care.214 
A private cause of action exists for breach of fiduciary duty under 
ERISA215 because “appropriate equitable relief”216 must be granted “directly to 
 
 208. See Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan E., Inc., 333 F.3d 450 (3d Cir. 2003), see also 
ERISA § 404 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000)). 
 209. See Horvath, 333 F.3d at 450. 
 210. Strategically, Horvath’s decision not to proceed on the material information theory may 
have been well-advised because the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had already ruled 
formalistically in Ehlmann that nondisclosure of physician financial incentives was not material 
information.  Ehlmann, 198 F.3d at 556. 
 211. Horvath, 333 F.3d at 453.  Under the “diminished value theory” Horvath alleged 
damages resulting from the difference between the employees’ perceived value of a plan 
including physician financial incentives versus a plan without incentives for rationing care.  Id. 
 212. Id. at 453. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Compare Id. at 456–57, with McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234, 
237 (5th Cir. 1995) (attempting to analogize the kickbacks in Horvath with the undisclosed rate 
increases in McDonald). 
 215. See Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(holding that failure to disclose “material information” upon request of beneficiary constituted 
breach of HMOs fiduciary duty). 
 216. ERISA § 404(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000)), ERISA § 
502(a)(3) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000)). 
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a participant or beneficiary.”217  Neither party to this case heavily contested 
whether Keystone qualified as a fiduciary under ERISA.218  A beneficiary need 
not request information from the fiduciary before fiduciary duties under 
ERISA are imposed.219  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals regarded Keystone 
as an ERISA fiduciary and accordingly held that Horvath and other employees 
were entitled to certain rights: 1) “to receive particular information” and 2) “to 
have Keystone act in a fiduciary capacity.”220  The Third Circuit previously 
held that an ERISA fiduciary must disclose “material facts, known to the 
fiduciary but unknown to the beneficiary” and that must be known for 
beneficiary’s protection.221 
Horvath’s claim for injunctive relief demanded that employees receive 
information regarding physician financial incentive plans when deciding 
whether to enroll.222  She claimed Keystone’s concealment of details regarding 
its physician incentive plans interfered with her duties as plan administrator.223  
“Congress’ purpose in enacting the ERISA disclosure provisions [was to] 
ensur[e] that the individual participant knows exactly where he stands with 
respect to the plan.”224  Keystone claimed that it fulfilled ERISA’s fiduciary 
duties because it provided a directory of physicians covered by the plan and 
sent a letter to Horvath outlining its policy of “attempting to ‘control the 
increase of health care costs through negotiated agreements with health care 
providers, doctors, hospitals, pharmacy, and ancillary providers.’”225 
Horvath sought equitable and legal relief in the form of “restitution, 
disgorgement and an injunction barring Keystone from continuing to omit 
information regarding physician incentives from its disclosures to plan 
members.”226  Horvath’s monetary damages for restitution and/or 
 
 217. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). 
 218. Horvath, 333 F.3d at 453 n.2. 
 219. Glaziers & Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Sec., Inc., 
93 F.3d 1171 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that disclosure must occur when fiduciary is on notice as to 
certain information, disclosure of which would prevent a beneficiary’s misinformed or harmful 
decision regarding an ERISA plan, but rejecting requirement that beneficiary make specific 
inquiry). 
 220. Horvath, 333 F.3d at 456. 
 221. Glaziers, 93 F.3d at 1182; McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234, 
237 (5th Cir. 1995); Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 222. Horvath, 333 F.3d at 453; CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra 
note 65 (emphasizing initial disclosure of benefit plan information to consumers because initial 
choice of plan has significant impacts on future choices such as physicians, facilities, and 
treatment options); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1104. 
 223. See Horvath, 333 F.3d at 456; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1132(a)(3) (2000). 
 224. Gillis v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 4 F.3d 1137, 1148 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 118 (1989)). 
 225. Horvath, 333 F.3d at 453. 
 226. Id. at 455. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
272 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:245 
disgorgement were dismissed by the court because she could not demonstrate 
individual loss resulting from Keystone’s failure to disclose, nor could she 
establish an amount she and other employees overpaid as a result of non-
disclosure.227 
The Third Circuit proceeded to the merits of the injunctive relief claim 
because violation of ERISA § 404 fiduciary duties entitles a plaintiff to relief 
and satisfies Article III injury requirements.228  The court previously held that a 
claim could be sustained if the plaintiffs established a “tangible economic 
harm” and could show that “health care they received under [the] plan actually 
was compromised or diminished as a result of . . . management decisions 
challenged in the complaint.”229 
The Third Circuit held that Horvath could not sustain a cause of action 
against her HMO for breach of fiduciary duty for failure to disclose physician 
financial incentives because the HMO had no duty to disclose that 
information.230  ERISA imposes no disclosure requirements on HMOs 
regarding physician incentives unless a plan participant requests such 
information or circumstances exist to put the HMO on notice that disclosure of 
such information may prevent the participant from making a harmful decision 
with respect to her health-care coverage.231  Absent evidence she was harmed 
as a result of not having such information disclosed, Horvath’s claim must 
fail.232  Horvath did not properly request information regarding physician 
incentive plans, and accordingly Keystone could not have known that the 
information was necessary to avoid harm.233  Following a similar decision in 
the Fifth Circuit,234 the court refused to add physician financial incentives to 
the list of disclosures required by ERISA, but in doing so the court ignored 
Eighth Circuit decisions to the contrary.235 
 
 227. Compare Horvath, 333 F.3d at 457, with McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 
60 F.3d 234, 237 (3d Cir. 1995).  In order to sustain a claim for misrepresentation by an ERISA 
fiduciary, a plaintiff must claim that: defendant was acting as a fiduciary, defendant made a 
misrepresentation, the misrepresentation was material, and plaintiff relied on the 
misrepresentation to her detriment.  See Daniels v. Thomas & Betts Corp., 263 F.3d 66, 73 (3d 
Cir. 2001). 
 228. Horvath, 333 F.3d at 456; see supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text. 
 229. Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 488 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing physician financial 
incentive plans challenged under RICO, but utilizing the same analysis); see also Shea v. 
Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914 (1997). 
 230. Horvath, 333 F.3d 462–63. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. See Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Tex., 198 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 235. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997). 
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VI.  ANALYSIS OF DISCLOSURE DECISIONS BY THE FEDERAL COURTS OF 
APPEALS 
Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan East, Inc. was the latest decision in a 
string of cases outlining the duties of HMOs to their beneficiaries.236  Horvath 
involved a disclosure issue where a beneficiary challenged the disclosure 
practices of her HMO, alleging that nondisclosure at initial enrollment and 
continued concealment of physician incentive plan violated ERISA disclosure 
rules and diminished the value of the health plan to employees.237  Horvath 
urged the Third Circuit Court of Appeals to expand the disclosure requirements 
under ERISA, but the court rejected her claim because it found that controlling 
exploding health-care costs outweighed the protection which might be derived 
from expanding existing ERISA disclosure rules. 
The Horvath Court acknowledged that HMOs exist to establish cost-
containment measures for providing medical coverage to employees and are 
not inherently wrong.238  Relying on the Pegram analysis, the court found that 
cost-controlling measures are balanced by the physicians’ “professional 
obligation to provide covered services with a reasonable degree of skill and 
judgment in the patient’s interest.”239  However, the court accepted the conflict 
of interest inherent in managed care, recognizing that a physician’s incentive 
under a HMO is to provide patients with less care, not more.240 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals erred in deciding Horvath’s case on 
grounds other than fiduciary duty responsibilities.  “ERISA does require, 
however, that the fiduciary with two hats wear only one at a time, and wear the 
fiduciary hat when making fiduciary decisions.”241  The Horvath Court’s 
analysis should have focused on whether disclosure of Keystone’s physician 
incentive plan was a “material fact[], known to the fiduciary but unknown to 
the beneficiary,” 242 that Horvath and other employees should have known 
about for their pecuniary protection.243 
The Horvath Court ruled against the plaintiff because she failed to request 
information from Keystone, Keystone was not on notice that disclosing 
information was necessary to prevent plaintiff from making a harmful decision, 
and the plaintiff failed to show how information on physician incentives was 
 
 236. See Horvath, 333 F.3d at 450. 
 237. Id. at 453. 
 238. Id. at 454 (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 219 (2000)). 
 239. Id. (citing Pegram, 530 U.S. at 219). 
 240. See id.; see also Pegram 530 U.S. at 219; Doe v. Group Hosp. & Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80 
(4th Cir. 1993). 
 241. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 225; see Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443–44 
(1999); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996). 
 242. Glaziers & Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Sec., Inc., 
93 F.3d 1171, 1182 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 243. See supra text accompanying notes 217–27. 
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material because her employer only offered one option for insurance 
coverage.244  However, Supreme Court jurisprudence should put Keystone on 
notice that non-disclosure of information that is essential to assist beneficiaries 
in evaluating the quality of their health-care coverage may cause economic 
harm. 
It is likely that the United States Supreme Court will take up the issue of 
physician financial incentives and the scope of ERISA’s disclosure rules.  The 
Court should look at the differing standards established by the Federal Courts 
of Appeals and adopt a factors test to determine whether disclosure is 
necessary in a particular situation.  Establishing a bright-line test for 
mandatory disclosures is unworkable because many different factors may come 
into play in a court’s final decision.  Factors considered by Federal Courts of 
Appeals included the materiality of the information,245 whether a request was 
made for information,246 whether concealment of the incentive plan caused the 
beneficiary to make a health-care decision adverse to their health,247 the 
occurrence of any adverse effects resulting from improper administrative 
decisions,248 and schedule changes affecting the employer’s ability to provide 
coverage.249  A factors test that weighs the many variables that determine 
whether nondisclosure of physician incentive plans is appropriate will provide 
the most flexibility for interpreting ERISA § 404 disclosure rules and will 
allow the trial court to evaluate the merits of each case with a set of criteria to 
weigh facts against. 
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The Court’s factors test may also include an examination of positive 
incentives implemented by HMOs or administrators to encourage positive 
outcomes in patient treatment.  A new movement has been sweeping through 
employer benefit plans whereby participating plans pay physicians bonuses for 
improving the health of employees.250  Landro explained that physicians 
receive yearly bonuses for adequately measuring and controlling a diabetic’s 
blood pressure, blood sugar, and lipid levels.251  General Electric, Ford Motor 
Company, UPS and Verizon were listed as employers participating in such a 
plan.252  Positive physician incentive plans support the core concept behind 
HMO’s: reducing costs by promoting healthy lifestyles through preventative 
measures. 
With the narrowing scope of ERISA pre-emption, state legislatures are 
beginning to respond with initiatives to circumvent ERISA.  California 
recently enacted the California Health Insurance Act of 2003, which requires 
all employers with fifty or more employees to offer employees and dependents 
group health insurance or pay into a state health insurance pool.253  The fee is 
waived for companies who provide at least a percentage of health insurance 
coverage to employees.254  California’s statute is innovative because it skirts 
the edges of ERISA jurisprudence.  The California Health Insurance Act of 
2003 does not regulate plan administration or mandate benefits; it merely 
requires employers to provide coverage.  Like the surcharges in Travelers, the 
California Health Insurance Act of 2003 may only have an indirect economic 
connection to employee benefit plans because it makes providing group health 
coverage to employees a “less unattractive” option and may ultimately prove 
more cost effective than paying into the state insurance pool.255  Even if the 
California Health Insurance Act of 2003 is pre-empted, it may be saved in the 
second step of the ERISA analysis.256  The Act may be saved if it is 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
276 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:245 
“specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance” and “substantially 
affect[s] risk pooling arrangements between the insurer and the insured.”257 
Even though physicians and patients are disgruntled about managed care 
reimbursement, the Federal Courts of Appeals recognize that cost-conserving 
measures in a health-care system with limited resources are desirable, and 
physician financial incentives may be the least restrictive and most effective 
control.258  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals was willing to accept the risk of 
lower quality health care in order to constrain health-care costs and allow 
employers to provide insurance at a reasonable cost. 259 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The mere presence of financial incentives is not necessarily troubling.  
However, the presence of financial incentives ought to be disclosed to 
employees. Without information regarding their physician’s outside influences, 
patients cannot be informed consumers and remain unable to fully evaluate a 
situation that may affect their long-term health.  Like Travelers, the presence 
of financial incentives may make one employee benefit plan “less unattractive” 
than others.  Unless incentive plans are disclosed at enrollment, the consumer 
will continue to be disadvantaged in his ability to evaluate costs and benefits 
associated with each benefit option. 
A balance must be struck between the policy to control inflationary health-
care costs and maintaining physicians’ obligations to “carry out that regimen 
which, according to my power and discernment, shall be for the benefit of my 
patients; I will keep them from harm and wrong.”260  Even though the courts 
have not yet embraced the potential value of Horvath’s “diminished value” 
theory, medical journals indicate that patients and medical professionals 
appreciate that the appearance of a conflict of interest can cause as much of a 
negative impact as an actual conflict.  Horvath showed us just beyond where 
the court was willing to go but outlined criteria that may be beneficial to 
sustaining a diminished value theory in future litigation.  To be sure, so long as 
health-care costs skyrocket, courts, as a policy matter, will remain willing to 
accept the risk of reduced quality health care in order to keep an eye on the 
bottom line. 
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